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Two conceptual approaches to the mind-body problem have 
been prevalent throughout history. One view sees man as split 
into two or more divisions, while the other sees man as a basic 
unity. The present article will give consideration to these differing 
views and their implications for a Christian philosophy of man. 
Also, arguments for a thorough-going monistic view of man will 
be presented. 
1. Dualism Versus Monism: The Mind-Body Problem 
The dualistic view sees man as composed of mind and body-the 
mental and the physical (in ancient anthropological terms, "soul 
and body" or "spirit and body"). This "ghost-in-the-machine" 
model has a long history, dating from Plato and other early Greek 
philosophers. In modern times, the outstanding success of the 
field of medicine in conquering disease has reinforced a kind of 
"mind-plus-plumbing'? conception of man. Although the mind and 
the plumbing are thought to interact, there seems to be an 
implicit belief that man is composed of psyche and soma, as the 
term "psychosomatic medicine7' suggests. 
In its strongest form, dualism suggests that man is mind and 
body. In a somewhat weaker, but more subtle form, it implies 
that mental events are correlated with physical events, or that the 
mind influences the body. But to speak of correlation is to imply 
that there are two factors or two entities involved, for one cannot 
correlate something with itself. I t  is precisely this kind of inter- 
actional or correlational dualism which is probably adhered to by 
many Christians who reject the more direct and overt theory 
of mind-body dualism. 
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The monistic model rejects any splitting of man into parts and 
views him as a unified organism of great complexity and varied 
functioning. This view rejects the notion that he is composed of 
a mind and a body which interact ( a  weak form of dualism), 
but rather emphasizes man's absolutely basic unity. To use an 
analogy from modern physics, we know that a flash of lightning 
is an electrical discharge. There are not two things, the flash and 
the discharge. There is just one thing; the flash is the electrical 
discharge. These are but two different ways of characterizing the 
same event. Similarly, according to the monistic theory, there do 
not exist mental events which are correlated with physiological 
events; rather, a "mental" event is also a "physiological" event. 
The terminology simply represents two ways of characterizing the 
selfsame event. 
The monistic view of man as a complex but unified person 
reflects Aristotle's revolt against Plato's dualism. More import- 
antly, however, antedating these Greek philosophers, the ancient 
Sumerians and Egyptians had a unitary view of man. To the 
Egyptians, immortality was unthinkable without a body. Similarly, 
OT Hebrew thought was not dualistic in any Platonic sense.' 
Interestingly, although some Christians today have a clearly- 
articulated monistic philosophy for discussing the state of the 
dead, when they begin to consider man as a living functioning 
organism they often lapse into a kind of dualism where man is 
seen to be composed of mind and body. In this essay, I first 
survey some of the common causes for "compartmentalization of 
man," indicating that the philosophical bases for dualism are 
questionable. Then I cite modern research, which raises further 
doubts about the validity of a "mind-body" split. And finally, I 
call attention to the fact that the model of man presented in the 
NT is monistic, and endeavor to set forth some theological im- 
plications of a monistic philosophy in contrast to a dualistic one. 
J.  E. Royce, "Does Person or Self Imply Dualism?," American Psychologist 
28 (1973): 883-891. 
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2. Common Causes for the Compartmentalization of Man 
The basic unity of man, which is the major premise of the 
monistic model, is often overlooked simply because of the fact 
that man is a complex being, possible to view from various per- 
spectives. Further, the common every-day ways of talking about 
man-with references to both his subjective feelings and his ob- 
servable behavior-tend to imply some sort of basic division. 
Additionally, various theological and philosophical writers des- 
cribe man by using terminology such as "body and mind," or 
"body and soul," or even "body, mind, and soul." In advocating 
the monistic model, I am suggesting that all of these various 
divisions, compartments, and fractions are apparent, not real, and 
that there are no compelling grounds for believing in any sub- 
stantive divisions within man. 
Let us now look more closely at some of the reasons which 
lead us to compartmentalize, fractionize, and divide man. First 
of all, the complexity of man allows for many descriptions-each 
unique, incomplete, and not reducible to the terms of another 
system. If one were making a speech, for example, a biochemist 
could write chemical equations describing changes taking place 
in the muscles controlling the vocal cords, a neurologist with the 
aid of an electroencephalograph could record electrical activity 
at the cortex, a speech analyst could observe variations in the 
speaking, and a journalist could comment on the literary quality 
of the production. Each specialist would have his own unique 
view and his own particular 'bag of tools," but all would be 
describing the same unified person. It is only our study of man 
that is broken down into separate fields; man himself functions 
as a unified whole. 
Unfortunately, some scholars have succumbed to the "nothing- 
butism" syndrome, fervently proclaiming that their particular 
logical system and vocabulary is the only relevant way to analyze 
man. Thus, man has variously been proclaimed to be nothing 
but a product of conditioning2 nothing but a vast and complex 
"Cf. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Freedom and Dignity (New York, 1971). 
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series of chemical reactions, nothing but a naked ape. Humanists 
and theologians have reacted by saying that man is more than 
chemicals, more than a product of conditioning, more than an 
animal. When confronted with how he is more than chemicals, 
etc., they have presented physical scientists with an entirely dif- 
ferent language and system of logic, and very little real com- 
munication has occurred. 
The solution to this communication barrier seems to reside in 
understanding that physical scientists and theologians have dif- 
fering but complementary systems. An introspective mentalistic, 
spiritual, or ethical description of a human activity does not 
rival, but rather enhances, a description in physical terms. It  is 
an illustration of the complexity of man that he can be simul- 
taneously described as a rational being, a moral agent, and a 
living biological organism. These apparently opposing descrip- 
tions are a result of how we choose to analyze man, but they in 
no way reflect any substantive divisions. Confusion results when 
the vocabulary of the theologian, for example, is mixed with that 
of the physical scientist. 
Another factor which contributes to a compartmentalized view 
of man is the fact that he is both a doer and an observer. He 
experiences in a personal, subjective way what others observe in 
him from a distance. This has resulted in the development of two 
languages-the experiential language of the doer and the 
descriptive language of the observer. Writers, philosophers, and 
theologians often focus on man's subjective experiences, speaking 
of thoughts, will power, motives, decisions, etc. They use meta- 
phors, analogies, and mentalistic constructs. The term "mind," for 
example, is a broad metaphor, subsuming a large number of 
mentalistic constructs. In contrast, physical scientists, psy- 
chologists, and others interested in an objective description of 
observable behavior have eschewed terms like "mind"; they use, 
instead, such terms as "brain," "central nervous system," and the 
like, to describe the organism and its interactions with the 
environment. 
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It is confusing to mix the logic and vocabularies of the subjec- 
tive and objective frames of reference. The language of intro- 
spective reports is different from the language of material 
processes, and follows a different logic. "Mind is a word which 
belongs to a different logical vocabulary than "brain." There is 
no problem in using the metaphorical language involving terms 
such as "mind," as long as we recognize that we are using ab- 
stractions. Often, however, we attribute concreteness and reality 
to these mentalistic constructs, treating them as if they exist in 
a material sense. We should either talk about the brain, nervous 
system, etc., and how these relate to other aspects of the organism, 
or we should use the internal metaphorical language of mind, 
thoughts, decisions, and the like; but to mix the language of 
these two systems produces confusion. 
Regardless of which system we are using, it should be clear 
that we are talking about a single unified organism. Because of 
these dual language systems, it is easy to subscribe to the dualistic 
view of man, but such a division is simply a peculiarity deriving 
from our language usage, and does not reflect any substantive 
division. 
In summary, then, although man is complex and although 
we tend to view him from a number of perspectives, the "divi- 
sions" merely represent ways of talking about man, and the 
fractionization is only apparent, not real. Further, our use of 
subjective and objective language systems seems to imply that 
man is a dualistic creature with an inner life and an external 
body; but again, such a split is simply an illusion created by our 
usage of language. In reality, man is a unified whole. 
3. Recent Experimental Findings 
The "ghost-in-the-machine" view of man has further been 
perpetuated by the fact that we have almost no vocabulary with 
which to describe our internal processes. Our language simply 
lacks words to describe clearly how the "insides" of our bodies 
feel. Moreover, inasmuch as in the past there have been few ways 
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to observe such internal activities and even fewer ways to con- 
trol them, most people have not been overly disturbed by the lack 
of a precise vocabulary; and thus they have settled for a more 
metaphoric and subjective language-all this seemingly adding 
support to the dualistic notion of a kind of mystical, subjective, 
inner "ghost" within men. 
Recently, however, the use of biofeedback techniques has 
tended to alter this s i t~at ion.~ It has now become possible for 
persons visually to observe their own heart rate, blood pre~sure,~ 
or even the electrical activity of their  brain^.^ Using this tech- 
nology, it has become possible to train people to control these 
activities within certain limits. Much of this research has been 
carried on by Russian psychologists, who have for some time 
been interested in developing control over internal activities. In 
this country, psychologist Neal Miller and his associates have 
been able to train rats to control contractions of their stomachs, 
the volume of blood in their ears, and even urine formation in 
their kidneys6 Other researchers have used biofeedback methods 
to demonstrate that a human can learn to control his sweat-gland 
activity, blood pressure, heart rate, and various other processes 
formerly thought to be involuntary. A Russian psychologist des- 
cribed a person who could alter his heart rate over a range of 
forty beats per minute merely by visualizing himself as asleep or 
as vigorously active. This same person could elevate the skin 
temperature of his right hand by imagining it was on a hot stove 
while simultaneously lowering the temperature of his left hand 
by imagining he was holding an ice cube.7 Although such dra- 
M. Karlins and L. Andrews, Biofeedback: Turning on the Power o f  Your 
Mind (Philadelphia, 1972). 
'D. Shapiro, "Effects of Feedback and Reinforcement on the Control of 
Human Systolic Blood Pressure," Science 163 (1969): 588-590. 
J. Kamiya, "Conscious Control of Brainwaves," Readings in Psychology 
Today (DeI Mar, California, 1972). 
Neal E. Miller, "Learning of Visceral and Glandular Responses," Science 
I63 (1 969): 434-445. 
P. J. Lang, "Automatic Control," Readings in Psychology Today (Del Mar, 
California, 1972). 
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matic changes have not been obtained with most subjects, it  has 
been clearly demonstrated that internal processes are not mystical 
and uncontrollable events. 
Although philosophical issues are never settled by scientific 
experiments, recent evidence is certainly consistent with a 
monistic view of man. It does not surprise the monistic theorist 
to discover that man can control the electrical activity of his 
brain. This is simply another way of saying that he can control 
his thoughts. There are not two things-electrical activity and 
thoughts-; rather, these represent but two ways of looking at 
the same event. 
As new research evidence accumulates, man emerges more 
and more as a total, unified organism, and the concept of a 
"ghost7' within the "machine" is less tenable; there seems to be 
no substantive split between mind and body, and the distinction 
between thinking and doing appears to be artificial. In reality, 
thinking is doing. For example, in my own research, designed to 
help people stop smoking, I have found this to be true. 1f-two 
matched groups of smokers are given different treatments- 
subjects of one group actually puffing on a cigarette while 
receiving a mild electric shock, and subjects in another com- 
parable group imagining smoking while receiving the shock-, 
superior results occur with persons in the group that imagines 
smoking.8 To the addicted smoker, imagining smoking is in 
some respects more "real" than actually smoking. Conceivably, 
he could smoke a cigarette "absent mindedly7' (that is, without 
thinking about it) ; but when he vividly imagines engaging in 
such behavior, it becomes very real. 
We may conclude that a monistic view of man seems most 
consistent with current philosophical and scientific thinking. 
4. Theological Implications of a Monistic Philosophy 
As must be implicit in the previous remarks, I object to the 
J. M. Berecz, "Modification of Smoking Behavior through Self-administered 
Punishment of Imagined Behavior: A New Approach to Aversion Therapy," 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 38 (1972): 244-250. 
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Greek dualistic notion that man is "mind" and "body." Even in 
the more subtle form that mind interacts with or influences the 
body, such thinking is misleading. The Greek model of man 
begins with the erroneous basic premise that man is dualistic, 
and then attempts to put him back together with the glue of a 
"holistic'' philosophy. Unfortunately, many Christians have ac- 
cepted this erroneous basic premise. As a result they often break 
man down into a dichotomous or trichotomous being, consisting 
of body and mind, or of body, mind, and soul. This is unnecessary 
in the light of current knowledge. 
A monistic viewpoint is, I believe, reflected in the NT as well 
as OT. If one keeps in focus the fact that NT writers were trying 
to communicate in a culture profoundly influenced by Hellenistic 
thinking, their apparent references to a dualistic nature of man 
can be seen to result from their use of language. The substantive 
content of their writings is clearly consistent with a monistic view 
of man. 
For example, in using such terms as "flesh" and "spirit," Paul 
was not using them in the dualistic Greek sense as a contrast 
between man's lower passions and his reason, but rather he 
was illustrating an ethical contrast. This is clearly articulated, 
for example, by W. D. Stacey, who writes as follows: 
From a superficial point of view, flesh and spirit are antitheti- 
cal. In Greek thought, they represented the tangible and the 
intangible, the base and the lofty, the contaminated and the pure, 
the bound and the free. This contrast is fundamental in Platon- 
ism, Orphism, and Hellenistic thought generally. T o  the Hebrew 
mind, the contrast would not be so evident and would concern 
different aspects of the one person. . . . 
He [Paul] did not regard the flesh as separate from man as a 
whole, and it is certain that he never discussed spirit as a sub- 
stance. . . . Paul's contrast was between man as a human being 
seeking to live a godless life, and man as a child of God seeking 
fellowship with Him. . . . 
A constructive statement must begin by recalling the meaning 
Paul gives to the two terms. Spirit stands for the divine life and 
power as manifested to men. Its end is to bring men to God, to 
give rise to virtues, and to impart eternal life. The flesh stands 
for the weakness and frailty of man which entertains evil and so 
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separates from God and leads to death. . . . The contrast be- 
tween these two is not a metaphysical distinction? 
Stacey quotes from J. A. T. Robinson that Paul "is not referring 
to the conflict, familiar to Greek ethics, between man's reason 
and his passions" and then goes on to add his own further com- 
ment that Paul rather is "being practical and ethical, in the true 
Hebrew tradition. He is always thinking, either of his own 
experience, or that of his converts."1° 
In addition to exploring Paul's use of the words "flesh" and 
"spirit," Stacey also analyzes how Paul used expressions such as 
"soul," "bodyYy' "heart," "mind," "conscience," and "inward man." 
After a thorough exploration of these various terms, Stacey 
draws the following conclusions: 
The Hebrew did not see man as a combination of contrasted 
elements, but as a unity that might be seen under a number of 
different aspects. Behind each aspect was the whole personality. 
Platonism, Orphism, and the Greek view generally, provide the 
opposite point of view. In this matter, Paul was in the Hebrew 
tradition. Every word in Paul refers to the whole man. . . . 
Man as a unity could have a hundred different aspects, and a 
hundred different words to describe them. If some overlapped 
and became confused, it was of no consequence. In any case, 
each included all, so some confusion was inevitable. The one 
fact that remained clear was that man, with all his diversity of 
aspects, was an integral unity.ll 
Without a clearly-articulated monistic philosophy of man, we 
are likely to make false distinctions between "mind and matter," 
or between "thinking and doingyy; we are prone to assume that 
"thoughts" occur in the isolated privacy of our craniums, and 
that "thinking" is somehow less real than "doing." Thus, we are 
likely to miss' the meaning of Christ's statement in Mt 5:28 that 
to lust for a woman is to commit adultery already, because 
what happens in our brain and other parts of our organism 
when we "lusty' is similar to what would occur if we were to 
engage overtly in the behavior about which we fantasize. There 
W. D. Stacey, The Pauline View of M a n  (New York, 1956), pp. 174-178. 
lo Ibid., p. 178. 
Ibid., pp. 222-223. 
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is research which clearly demonstrates this.12 
A monistic philosophy emphasizes the idea that although we 
can talk about man from either a theological or a physiological 
perspective, one viewpoint is not more "real" than the other. 
Terminology of either perspective could conceivably be used 
in theological discussion itself, depending upon the particular 
aspect of truth and reality on which we wish to focus. 
Moreover, it may be well to point out that many of the false 
dichotomies which arise in theological discussions are directly 
related to the dualistic language we use in talking about man. 
The "faith versus works" issue is a case in point. Faith is often 
seen as being exercised in the arena of the mind. Thus there is 
a kind of mystical, nonreal quality about it. Works, on the other 
hand, are viewed as being carried out by the body, and hence 
appear to be less mystical in nature. Therefore, when a thorough- 
going monistic view of man is espoused, the issue of faith versus 
works is more likely to be seen in its unified sense: Faith is real 
behavior, and works also are real behavioral acts. Those more 
private behaviors which occur primarily in the brain, we are 
likely to label as having to do with faith; those behaviors which 
we observe overtly as skeletal movements, we are more likely 
to label as works. Monistic philosophy sensitizes us to the fact 
that we are not dealing with a dichotomy, but rather that we 
are using different words as labels for equally "real" points of 
a behavioral continuum. 
5. Conclusion 
I would suggest that a monistic view of man seems most con- 
sistent with current thinking in the behavioral sciences and with 
the biblical viewpoint. Since man is tremendously complex, 
many different theoretical perspectives and vocabularies are 
utilized in describing him. Each system gives a partial picture 
and focuses on different aspects. It is our language systems and 
theories which create the illusion of man's being made up of 
various "parts," but man himself is an integral unity. 
" W. H. Masters and V. E. Johnson. Human Sexual Response (Boston, 1966). 
